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The Supreme Court‘s five to four decision applying the Second 
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment has 
produced paradoxical reactions.
1
  The New York Times calls the ruling 
 
* John F. Seiberling Chair of Law and Director of the University of Akron Constitutional Law 
Center, established by the U.S. Congress in 1987.  See 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/constitutionallaw/.  Comments and questions may be sent to 
raynes@uakron.edu.  For a general analysis of applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, 
see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. 
J. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham].  For my prior work on the 
confluence between the Second and Fourteenth amendment, see Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not:  
The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, especially 1319-20 
(2009), available at http://www.pennjcl.com/issues/11/11.5/11-5%20Aynes.pdf [hereinafter Aynes, 
Ink Blot or Not] and Richard L. Aynes, McDonald v. Chicago, the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Right to Bear Arms and the Right of Self-Defense, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 170 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=143:aynes20
10170&catid=20:firearmsinc&Itemid=20 [hereinafter Aynes, The Right to Bear Arms and the Right 
of Self-Defense].  This symposium was also reproduced in a limited print edition. 
 1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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―an enormous symbolic victory for supporters of gun rights‖ and the 
Washington Post says it may be ―more symbolic than substantive.‖2  
On the one hand, it is the first time the Court has enforced a new 
provision of the Bill of Rights against the states in forty years.
3
  On the 
balance scale between the views of Justice Black and those of Justice 
Frankfurter, it puts another weight on Black‘s side of the scales.4 
On the other hand, it has been observed that McDonald ―did come 
out . . . as predicted . . . .‖5  As I have observed before,6 McDonald’s end 
 
 2. Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Extends Second Amendment to the States, Casts 
Doubt on Chicago Handgun Ban, ABA JOURNAL (June 28, 2010, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_extends_second_amendment_to_the_ 
states/.  Douglas Berman wrote in a blog for Sentencing Law and Policy that McDonald v. Chicago 
was ―as big as it gets.‖  A Gun Case or Pandora’s Box?:  Ruling Could Trigger the Unhinging of 
American Culture, (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/12/a-gun-case-or-pandoras-box-
ruling-could-trigger-the-unhinging-of-american-culture.html (citing A gun case or Pandora’s box?, 
WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/11/a-
gun-case-or-pandoras-box-55900250/. 
 3. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (no double jeopardy). 
 4. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and  id. at 
68 (Black, J. dissenting). . 
 5. Michael Dreeben, Supreme Court Review, THE NAT‘L L.J. 22 (Aug. 2, 2010).  See also, 
Scott Piepho, Privileges and Immunities in McDonald v. Chicago, AKRON LEGAL NEWS 1 (July 21, 
2010) (―The decision itself seemed pretty much fore-ordained . . . .‖) and Pat Oliphant, Editorial, 
Closing Arguments, AKRON BEACON J., June 30, 2010, at A6 (―The ruling hardly surprises, 
following the logic of the earlier decision.‖).  While some believed that McDonald might be the 
―blockbuster‖ of the 2009 Term, in retrospect, it was argued that the Court‘s decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), ―dominated the term.‖ See Sri 
Srinivasan, Supreme Court Review, supra.  In a review of the whole term, Law Week concluded that 
Citizens United and McDonald v. Chicago ―hogg[ed] the term.‖  79 U.S.L.W. 3033 (July 2010). 
Randy Barnett indicated that ―most . . . observers believed [McDonald] would succeed‖ in his 
challenge against the Chicago statutes. Randy Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the 
Challenge to Economic Mandates, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 2:11 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/10/17/the-differences-between-mcdonald-and-the-challenge-to-economic-
mandates [hereinafter Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the Challenge to Economic 
Mandates].  Certainly, it was a ―landmark ruling.‖ David M. O‘Brien, SUPREME COURT WATCH 
2010:  HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2007, 2008, AND 2009 TERMS AND PREVIEW OF THE 2010 TERM, 77 
(2011).  Of course it was not always so.  Besides opposition from Justice Frankfurter and his 
acolytes, some prominent scholars thought that intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to the 
contrary. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed By Time:  The Second Amendment and the Failure of 
Originalism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 167, 169 & 194 n.8 (2000) (―Regardless of how the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to bear arms, it seems doubtful that it should apply to 
the states.‖).   
 6. Richard Aynes, McDonald v. Chicago:  The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?, SCOTUS 
BLOG (June 29, 2010, 2:19 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-v-chicago-the-
blockbuster-of-the-2009-term/, and cross-posted at AKRON LAW CAFÉ BLOG (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/akron_law_cafe/2010/07/mcdonald-v-chicago-the-blockbuster-
of-the-2009-term/ [hereinafter Aynes, The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?]. The history of the  
Second Amendment is less than clear.  At common law and since at least the Assize of Arms 
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result merely reigns in the City of Chicago as a renegade and outlier,
7
 
just as Heller reined in the renegade and outlier Washington, D.C.
8
  To 
the extent we can judge the effect of Heller and McDonald, they are 
consistent with all fifty states‘ constitutional provisions and most of the 
existing state laws.
9
  Furthermore, they are consistent with what polls 
tell us is the view of the American people:  some people should have the 
right to have guns, but there should be limitations.
10
  Moreover, David 
Koppel reports that ―[i]n every state where the people have had the 
opportunity to vote directly, they have endorsed the right to arms by 
landslide margins.‖11 
Alan Gura, the attorney who successfully argued both Heller and 
McDonald, surely has ―it right‖ when he implicitly declared victory (it 
was a victory—he won both cases) and put the decision in a positive 
light: 
Critically, Justice Thomas‘s [concurring] opinion provides an excellent 
platform for restoring the Fourteenth Amendment‘s original public 
meaning.  That today‘s result has a strong historical basis may have 
increased the plurality‘s comfort level in utilizing substantive due 
process, but Justice Thomas demonstrated that concern for the 
constitutional text‘s original public  meaning was actually necessary to 
achieve the result.  In 1868, the public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities Clause commanded the 
 
(1181), all men of the tithing were required to have and to bear arms to respond to the ―hue and 
cry.‖ JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW 27 (2009).  On the other hand, the lack of personal weapons by private individuals was 
exemplified by the fact that during Confederate General John Hunt Morgan‘s raid through Indiana 
and Ohio, while many men showed up to defend those states with their own weapons, others said to 
be in the militia were not able to be used because of a lack of arms.   A COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF 
THE JOHN MORGAN RAID THROUGH KENTUCKY, INDIANA AND OHIO, IN JULY 1803 26 (n.p., Flora 
E. Simmons, publisher 1868) (several hundred militiamen were ―on hand, but without arms . . . .‖).  
At the same time, at common law, both tort and criminal law recognize the right of an individual to 
act in self-defense, with or without arms.  
 7. The only known cities to have the type of restrictive gun law that existed in Chicago and 
Washington, D.C., beside those two cities, are five Chicago suburbs. KOPEL,  infra note 8, at 132.  
 8. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 99, 122 (2010).  
 9. What Professor Adam Winkler wrote of Heller is equally applicable to McDonald.  
Dennis A. Henigan, Book Review, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 332 (2010) (reviewing MARK V. 
TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE:  WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN‘T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007) 
(―[T]he Heller case is a landmark decision that has not changed very much at all.‖)).  
 10. Kopel, supra note 8, at 117 n.68. 
 11. Id. at 122.  
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support of a ratifying nation.  After today, no one should doubt that it 
will yet command a majority of the Supreme Court.
12
 
I.  CHANGES 
Though I am suggesting the changes will be small, there will be 
changes.
13
  Both Heller and McDonald have demonstrated to all that the 
political leaders of states and the District of Columbia do not have 
―unfettered‖ leave to restrict the ownership of guns any more than they 
have ―unfettered‖ leave to restrict the right of free speech.  There are 
limits and people drafting legislation to regulate gun ownership will 
have to follow those limitations. 
McDonald affects not just the Chicago case, but also others that 
were pending at the time.  One of the most prominent of these is the 
Ninth Circuit case in Nordyke v. King,
14
 where the court held the 
Fourteen Amendment, through its Due Process Clause, required the 
enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states; but in that 
particular case the county ordinance did not violate those rights.  The 
panel opinion in Nordyke was vacated and remanded for reconsideration 
by the trial court in view of McDonald.
15
  
II.  JUSTICE ALITO‘S OPINION 
In many ways, the majority opinion authored by Justice Alito is a 
very modest one.  The Brief of the Respondent NRA
16
 was powerful in 
outlining the way in which Heller foreshadowed the result to be taken in 
McDonald.
17
  Indeed, even though some complained that McDonald had 
 
 12. Alan Gura, McDonald—A Victory for the Second Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (June 29, 
2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-a-victory-for-the-the-second-
amendment/.  
 13. David Cohen and Maxwell Stearns have indicated that Heller and McDonald ―will 
dramatically alter legal policy in vital urban centers.‖  David S. Cohen & Maxwell Stearns, 
McDonald Typifies Need for Consensus, THE NAT‘L L.J. 35 (July 12, 2010) 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463394661&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 
(emphasis added). But see supra notes 5, 6, 12 & 15 for a contrary view as to its effects upon the 
nation as a whole.  
 14. 563 F. 3rd 439 (9th  Cir. 2010) (judgment vacated). See also Maloney v. Ricea, 5545 F. 
3d 56, 77 U.S.L.W. 1473(2d Cir. 2009) (judgment vacated). 
 15. Nordyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 16. Under Supreme Court of the United States Rule 12, the NRA, a party below whose 
petition for certiorari was not granted, was treated as a respondent.  See Sup. Ct. R. 12. 
 17. Even historian Saul Cornell, who opposed both Heller and McDonald, concluded ―even 
if‖ Chicago‘s ordinance were to be declared unconstitutional, ―nothing else will likely change.‖  
Saul Cornell, A Possible Win for both Sides (Mar. 2, 2010, 7:17 PM) 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/states-rights-vs-gun-rights/?hp. 
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a surprising result,
18
 Justice Alito‘s opinion states that on the question of 
enforcing the Second Amendment against the states, ―our decision in 
Heller points unmistakably to the answer.‖19 
One part of the conservatism of the opinion is utilizing the Due 
Process Clause rather than the more historically accurate Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  Though, personally, I would have preferred Justice 
Thomas‘s ―more straightforward path,‖20 one can understand a desire to 
use established approaches.  As Justice Scalia said, in addressing a 
slightly different aspect of the case:  ―This case does not require me to 
consider [his misgivings over the concept of substantive due process], 
since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide 
it.‖21  Justice Thomas made the same point in his concurring opinion.  
The plurality opinion by Justice Alito used ―what is now a well-settled 
test . . .‖ in determining that the Due Process Clause would be a vehicle 
through which the Court would apply the Second Amendment against 
the states.
22
 
Yet, Justice Alito‘s opinion is not perfect.  Most notably is the 
misunderstanding of the Slaughter-House Cases.
23
  In its famous five to 
four decision in the Slaughter-House Cases,
24
 a bare majority of the 
Supreme Court, in dicta, gave a very narrow reading to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
25
  The issue before the Court was whether butchers could 
be required to use a state-provided slaughter-house as a health measure 
to prevent contamination of the drinking water of the City of New 
Orleans.  There is language in Justice Miller‘s opinion itself suggesting 
that his discussion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is dicta.
26
  In 
the opening portion of his opinion, Justice Miller wrote:  ―[W]e now 
propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the 
construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to 
 
 18. See Patrick Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald:  
“Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. 
CONST. L.& POL‘Y 7 (2011).  
 19. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).  
 20. Id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 23. I have previously written a more thorough analysis in Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the 
Law of Freedom:  Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom]. 
 24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).   
 25. Id. at 67. See Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23. 
 26. Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States:  The History and the 
Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 111 (2009) [hereinafter Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of 
Rights Against the States]. 
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the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither the 
inclination nor the right to go.‖27 
Justice Miller‘s opinion talks about being ―excused from defining 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . until 
some case . . . may make it necessary to do so.‖28 
Miller did not specifically speak to the issue of applying the Second 
Amendment or any of the amendments to the states, but, in dicta, he 
suggested a narrow reading for the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
29
  
Nevertheless, Miller himself later approved moving away from his 
narrow reading of the Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.
30
 
What is odd about this is that there are other provisions of Miller‘s 
opinion, which have been readily ignored.  For example, Miller said in a 
case, in which the plaintiffs were white butchers, that it would be hard to 
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause would 
ever apply to anyone except African Americans.
31
  As Dean John Norton 
Pomeroy noted shortly after the decision, Miller‘s conclusion 
―contradicts at once the meaning of the language and the facts of 
history.‖32  Further, the legislative history demonstrates that the Equal 
Protection Clause was also designed to protect white Unionists, from 
both the South and the North, in their free speech and other rights in the 
South.
33
  The courts have not been reluctant to ignore the privileges and 
immunities dicta.
34
  No one today doubts that the Equal Protection 
Clause applies to people of all races, not just African Americans.   
 
 27. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67.   
 28. Id. at 78 . Though this is speculation, one wonders whether an earlier draft stopped there 
and it was the dissenting justices that prompted him to go further. 
 29.  See RONALD M. LABBE & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:  
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  12 (2003) (―It might be 
more accurate to view Miller‘s comments on privileges and immunities as dicta rather than doctrinal 
holding.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 30. See id. at 248 n.51.   
 31. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80-82.  See Pomeroy, infra note 32, at 565 (some 
portions of the opinion ―seem[] to us utterly unnecessary to the decision of the case or to the main 
argument upon which the decision is based . . . .‖ (omission added)). 
 32. JOHN NORTON Pomeroy, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BY THEODORE 
SEDGWICK 564, (2d ed. 1874).  
 33.  Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 644-46 and especially 645 
(―[T]he debates are replete with indications that the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to 
protect Southern white Unionists, Northerners moving South, and aliens.‖ (footnote omitted)).  
 34. For example, just a few years later Judge Sawyer, in writing about the Fourteenth 
Amendment, stated that because of the way the amendment was written, ―its benefits could not have 
been intended to be limited to the [N]egro.‖  The R.R. Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 761 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) 
(Sawyer, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
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Similarly, one key part of the Court‘s dicta in Slaughter-House is 
that the butchers did not have a federal (Fourteenth Amendment) right to 
pursue the occupation of a butcher.
35
  Yet many subsequent decisions of 
the Court have recognized among the individual‘s ―fundamental rights 
which must be respected‖ the right ―to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life . . . .‖36 
This differing treatment of dicta on privileges and immunities and 
what is more central to the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases with 
respect to the race of the beneficiaries of the Equal Protection Clause 
suggests that more is at work here than simply trying to follow Supreme 
Court dicta.  One has to wonder why this dicta of Slaughter-House was 
not ignored with equal ease. 
In a pre-McDonald essay, David Hardy suggested:  ―There are 
some things in the Bill of Rights that various Justices over the years 
have just not liked, and it seems to me to be no more elegant than the 
individual prejudices against said rights being put into practice whenever 
possible.‖37 
Of course, whatever one thinks of Slaughter-House, the 
Cruikshank
38
 case clearly rejected the application of the Second 
 
 35. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872). Given the health considerations behind 
the underlying legislation and the fact that the monopoly was not over who could be a butcher, but 
rather where butchering could take place, it is more logical to believe this too was dicta.  Michael 
Ross has demonstrated that rather than creating a monopoly of who could be a butcher, the act in 
question actually destroyed the monopoly of the Gascon butchers and opened the occupation up to 
others, including African Americans. See MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS, 
SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR Era (2003).  
 36. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes the right to ―engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . .‖); Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Justice Marshall‘s dissenting opinion 
in Roth indicating that ―liberty to work . . . is the ‗very essence of the personal freedom and 
opportunity‘ secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ Id. at 588-89.  See also David H. Gans, The 
Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 907, 936 (2007) (―If an important aspect of 
citizenship is the individual‘s freedom to shape his or her destiny in society, choices about the work 
one performs daily should be protected as part of the freedom inherent in citizenship.‖ (citations 
omitted)). In the context of Article IV, the Court has stated:  ―Certainly, the pursuit of a common 
calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges provided by the Clause . . . .‖ United 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984).  
 37. David Hardy, Thoughts on the 14th Amendment Cases, (Feb. 23, 2009, 7:36 PM) 
http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/2009/02/thoughts _on_the_5.php  (last accessed July 31, 2010).  
 38.  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).  See generally, CHARLES LANE, THE 
DAY FREEDOM DIED:  THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
RECONSTRUCTION  (2008); NICHOLAS LEHMANN REDEMPTION:  THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL 
WAR (2006); and LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE:  THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK 
POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).  One would hope that if any 
of the current Justices were to explore the facts of the Colfax Massacre, a battle fought in the name 
of white supremacy, the Justices would condemn the Cruikshank case as a miscarriage of justice 
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Amendment to the states.  Yet, Cruikshank’s First Amendment views 
had been rejected and overruled.
39
  What reason is there to think its 
Second Amendment views are deserving of any more respect?  
A further matter on which the Court could be criticized is focusing 
upon the ―Due Process‖ Clause instead of considering Section 1 as a 
whole.  In his seminal dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,
40
 
Justice Black refused to limit his analysis to the Due Process Clause, but 
rather emphasized that he was in favor of finding the Bill of Rights 
applied to the state based upon the entire content of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
41
 
III.  JUSTICE THOMAS‘S CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Thomas used the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a 
vehicle through which to apply the Second Amendment against the 
states.
42
  Justice Thomas termed this ―a more straightforward path‖ to 
the enforcement of the Second Amendment against the states than that 
adopted by the majority.
43
  This is probably the most faithful to the 
intent of the framers and the people.  As did Justice Alito, Justice 
Thomas ignored the ―holistic‖ approach of using the entire section one 
to reach the same result.
44
 
There is such congruence between my scholarship and the 
concurring opinion that it is rather like one is replicating a scientific 
experiment and both times obtaining virtually the same result.  The fact 
that Justice Thomas‘s opinion is consistent with that of many scholars 
looking at the same information is confirmation of its correctness.
45
  It 
also makes it difficult for me to offer any critique of the opinion. 
The one area in which Justice Thomas is in error is in his approach, 
in dicta, to the application of the Establishment Clause to the states.
46
 
 
instead of a precedent to be followed. It would be akin to citing Dred Scott or Plessy v. Ferguson, 
not to document some historical fact, but because it was precedent and the Court chose to follow its 
dicta or its decision.  
 39. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925)). 
 40.  332 U.S. 46, 68-93 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 41.  Id.; See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 145 (2008); Gans, supra note 36. 
 42. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058-88 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 3058. 
 44. See id. at 3058-88. 
 45. See e.g., AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 231-57 
(1988). 
 46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at n.20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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In McDonald, Justice Thomas is willing to cite Kurt Lash‘s work 
arguing for a narrow view of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.
47
  But, as far as I can determine, even though Professor Lash 
appears to be the only person who has made an in-depth analysis of the 
Establishment Clause motivations of the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers,
48
 Justice Thomas has not cited it in any of his written opinions 
while on the Court.
49
  It is one thing to read Lash‘s 
Establishment/Fourteenth Amendment work and reject it with reason 
and citations.  But it is something quite different to ignore the very work 
of someone he cites as an authority. 
Further, as far as I can determine, Justice Thomas has evidenced no 
knowledge of the fact that several national churches split into northern 
and southern branches when the southern members seceded in order to 
maintain an ―established‖ church that would support slavery.50  Not 
treating the national breakdown of the churches over the issues of 
―establishing‖ slavery as part of the orthodoxy, it follows that Justice 
Thomas did not discuss the breakup of individual churches over the 
question of whether the Christian religion authorized slavery or not.
51
  
Nor does Justice Thomas acknowledge in any of his opinions that the 
slave-holding states used a ―licensing‖ system both before and during 
Reconstruction to try to ensure that only the ―established view‖ of 
 
 47. Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I:  “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L. J. 1241, 1256-57 (2010), cited in McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. at 3064 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 48. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause:  The Rise of the 
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (1995) (Southern establishment of 
proslavery religion was one of the problems meant to be remedied by the Privileges or Immunities 
clause).  For a somewhat more detailed treatment of Lash‘s work in this area and the 
interrelationship between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause, see Aynes, Ink Blot or 
Not, supra at note *. See also, DANIEL W. STOWELL, REBUILDING ZION:  THE RELIGIOUS 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTH, 1863-1877 (1998).       
 49. This is a result of a LEXIS search using the terms ―Thomas and Lash‖ conducted on 
September 26, 2010.  
 50. For an account of this breach within the national Methodist Church, see GEORGE R. 
CROOKS , THE LIFE OF BISHOP MATTHEW SIMPSON OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH (1891).  
 51. WILLIAM E. BARTELT, THERE I GREW UP:  REMEMBERING ABRAHAM LINCOLN‘S 
INDIANA YOUTH 12 (2008) (referencing the split over slavery of the South Fork Baptist Church in 
Hardin County, Kentucky in 1816 and the Little Mount Baptist Church‘s ―clearly anti-slavery 
stand‖ in Indiana).  For an account of the division in churches in Mississippi before the Civil War, 
see the autobiographical account of a Mississippi Unionist who escaped from a Mississippi prison, 
[Rev] JOHN B. AUGHEY, THE IRON FURNACE:  OR, SLAVERY AND SECESSION 247 (1863) (―The 
Methodist Church South is expunging from the discipline everything inimical to the peculiar 
institution . . . . The Church South refused to abide by the rules of the Church, and hence the guilt of 
the schism lied with her,‖ noting that founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, ―regarded 
[slavery] as the ‗sum of all villainy.‘‖). 
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slavery and white supremacy was preached.
52
  This is one of the dangers 
of dicta:  Justice Thomas evidences no familiarity with this portion of 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment Clause 
himself, and, by not waiting until a case which briefed those issues came 
before the Court, he expressed an opinion that seems to be opposite of 
what the facts would support.
53
 
One can only hope that, notwithstanding his expressions in dicta 
and his prior dissents, Justice Thomas will reserve his judgment until 
after a case-in-controversy has raised this issue, the parties have briefed 
the issue, the Court has heard oral argument, and he has examined the 
record in the controversy of an actual case. 
As for McDonald, with the exception of the dicta noted above, 
Thomas‘s opinion, while it can and will no doubt be critiqued, presented 
a reasonable view of the Amendment as contemplated by the people 
proposing and ratifying the Amendment.  
IV.  JUSTICE SCALIA‘S CONCURRING OPINION 
Given the indications in Heller that were predictive of the result in 
McDonald, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia joined Justice Alito‘s 
opinion.  Indeed, it would have been surprising if Scalia had repudiated 
the Heller dicta so quickly after the opinion that he had authored.  His 
dissent adds little to the position articulated by Justice Alito.  Instead, it 
was written ―only to respond to some aspects of Justice Steven‘s 
dissent.‖54  While Justice Steven‘s dissenting opinion and Justice 
Scalia‘s concurring opinion make nice bookends for a discussion of their 
 
 52. Lash, supra note 48, at n.234. 
 53. For example, it would not be surprising if we were to learn that Justice Thomas has no 
knowledge that as part of the efforts to establish a pro-slavery church, the Northern Methodist 
Church was labeled by a convention in Bonham, Texas as ―[a] secret forces lurk[ing with] . . . the 
manifest intention  [was] . . . to do away with slavery‖ and, unlike the proslavery Southern 
Methodist Church which was welcomed, the Northern Methodist Church was condemned.  This 
sentiment spread to include the state of Arkansas and by 1860 ―[a] number of the [Northern 
Methodist] ministers and many lay members fled the State.‖ HISTORY OF BENTON, WASHINGTON, 
CARROLL, MADISON, CRAWFORD, FRANKLIN, AND SEBASTIAN COUNTIES, ARKANSAS 786-87 
(Goodspeed Pub. Co., Chicago, 1889).  This is inconsistent with the many religious arguments made 
against slavery. For example, William Jay (1789-1858), the son of Chief Justice John Jay, argued 
that the southern laws prohibiting African Americans from reading or writing were ―tantamount to 
prevent[ing] him from having a direct revelation of God.‖  CARTER G. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION 
OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861:  A HISTORY OF THE EDUCATION OF THE COLORED PEOPLE  OF THE 
UNITED STATES FROM THE BEGINNING OF SLAVERY TO THE CIVIL WAR 169 (1919). 
 54. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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differing philosophies and the history of the Court, they add little to our 
understanding of the Court‘s opinion or predicting its consequences. 
However, in some ways Justice Scalia‘s opinion is the most 
disappointing of the lot.  In other cases and in other contexts, Justice 
Scalia purports to be a respecter of history and tradition.
55
  Yet, we see 
no evidence of those values here.  Even if the usually outspoken Scalia 
had a momentary need to be cautious, one would have expected him to 
at least make some slight bow to the concurring opinion of his oft-ally, 
Justice Thomas.
56
 
V.  THE DISSENTERS 
Previously, I have suggested that the City of Chicago made a 
tactical mistake in attempting to re-argue Heller.
57
  In such a situation, 
the best tactical approach from the Respondent‘s side is to embrace 
Heller, however reluctantly, and try to limit it to the applications to the 
federal government. 
Yet, such a view does not apply to the minority in Heller and 
McDonald.  They have the right and, perhaps, the duty to express their 
views and it may be in time their dissents will be landmarks which guide 
future decisions. 
A. Justice Stevens  
Justice Stevens had a long and distinguished career on the Court.  
McDonald is one of the last major decisions in which he participated.  
Unfortunately, his ―swan song‖ failed to do justice to his career.  This 
Illinois Republican had established a reputation for both independence 
and moderation.
58
  Whether affected by the intensity of the debate, 
frustration over his inability to command a majority, the burden of too 
many dissents that have yet to become law, or the effects of age and 
health, the dissent is mostly a hodgepodge of personal beliefs and 
 
 55. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. For example, he might have said:  ―Though there is much to commend in Justice Thomas‘ 
view, the current due process analysis suffices for the case before us and I will defer consideration 
of the privileges and immunities clause until a more propitious moment.‖  
 57. Aynes, The Blockbuster of the 2009 Term?, supra note 6.  But see Mike Scarcella, Heller 
II:  The Sequel, NAT‘L L.J. 17, 18 (Oct. 25, 2010) (In litigation over Washington D.C.‘s post-Heller 
legislation, Solicitor General Todd Kim of the D.C. Office of the U.S. Attorney General, who will 
argue the case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C., said that:  ―The District of Columbia fully 
respects the Heller decision.‖). 
 58. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 836 (Kermit L. Hall et al eds., 1992). 
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jurisprudential commentary without the force or weight one would 
expect of a senior dissenting Justice.
59
  Nevertheless, Justice Stevens 
makes an important point that apparently escaped the majority:  ―[E]ven 
if Heller had never been decided –indeed, even if the Second 
Amendment did not exist—we would still have an obligation to address 
the petitioner‘s Fourteenth Amendment claim.‖60 
Yet he never really addresses that claim, which is ―more 
compelling‖ under the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Second.61 
Justice Stevens sounds very much like Justice Miller in the failed 
Slaughter-House Cases, saying that ―the burden is severe for those to 
seek radical change in such an established body of constitutional 
doctrine.‖62  Over a hundred years ago, Justice Swayne answered Justice 
Miller in sentences that should also be an admonishment to Justice 
Stevens:  ―It is objected to that the power conferred is novel and large.  
The answer is that the novelty was known and the measure deliberately 
adopted.‖63  Justice Stevens evidences no knowledge that Justices like 
Swayne supported the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, while 
Justice Miller, who he perhaps was unaware he was mimicking, and 
others in the Slaughter-House majority opposed it.
64
 
Justice Stevens gives only a passing nod to the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
65
  He cites no statements, speeches, or other 
work of the framers or the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He 
takes no look at the legal treatises published between the proposal of the 
Amendment and its ratification.
66
  The closest he comes is his citation to 
the very weak 1965 work of Justice Frankfurter where Justice 
 
 59. Though there are no doubt different views of the opinion, my impression is consistent 
with that expressed by David Hardy:  ―In sum, the dissent bears the hallmark of a work that was 
rushed through rather than thought out.‖  David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet:  District of Columbia 
v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 68, available at 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HARDY_2010_61.pdf. 
 60. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3103 n.26 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61. Aynes, The Right to Bear Arms and the Right to Self-Defenses, supra note *, at 202. 
 62. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 129 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 64. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 660 & n.228. 
 65. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 and n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens cites none 
of the well-known Fourteenth Amendment scholars who have spent decades in studying the 
Amendment who would support his view, such as Raoul Berger or Charles Fairman.  This is, 
perhaps, because their views have long since been discredited and this was demonstrated to the 
Court in the Amicus Brief of Calguns, whose whole focus was upon scholars who had taken the 
Fairman/Berger position. 
 66. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 23, at 83-94 (discussing treatises by 
Justice Paschal, Dean Pomeroy, Judge Farrar, and Justice Cooley). 
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Frankfurter attempts to do a one-sided survey of the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
67
 
Stevens, born in 1920, ignores the first Justice Harlan (1833-1911), 
Chief Justice Chase (1808-1873), Justice Swayne (1804-1884), and 
others, but seems to have nostalgic feelings for the days of his youth 
when Justice Harlan II (1899-1971) was on the Bench.
68
  He states that 
he ―can hardly improve upon the many passionate defenses of this 
position that Justice Harlan penned during his tenure on the Court.‖69 
The fact that Justice Stevens is out of touch with both our history 
and current views is shown by his reaction to the fact that a super 
majority (31) of the states filed an amicus brief supporting McDonald:  
―It is puzzling that so many state lawmakers have asked us to limit their 
option to regulate a dangerous item.‖70 
Part of the Respondent Chicago‘s argument before the Court was 
that applying the Second Amendment to the state would spawn 
litigation.
71
  This same theme was sounded in Justice Steven‘s dissenting 
opinion
72
 and even in an editorial of the New York Times, referring to ―a 
bog of lawsuits that could take many years to clear.‖73  This approach 
may be superficially appealing, but it is logically flawed. 
We have had the Constitution since 1787.  Should we refrain from 
enforcing the Constitution because it is too much trouble?  The First 
Amendment has been applied to the states since 1925,
74
 and yet we still 
have suits about its meaning.  One can understand the large amount of 
litigation that raises questions on the Fourth Amendment right against 
search and seizure and yet we still apply it.  This is like saying that if we 
did not have a right to jury trial, or a right to cross-examine witnesses 
the state could more easily win its criminal cases.  That may be true, but 
it is not a reason to deny constitutional rights.  The fact that people may 
want to litigate the contours of the Second Amendment, as applied to the 
states, is no reason to violate the Constitution and refuse to apply the 
Amendment.  There are some people who believe (wrongly I think) that 
the First Amendment rights to free speech and free press should not be 
applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.  If someone 
 
 67. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 68. Id. at 3093 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 3115  n.47.   
 71. Brief for Respondent at 19-20, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 
5190478.   
 72. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73. Editorial, The Hard Work of Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at 7.   
 74. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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raised such an argument in litigation against the Times, one can be very 
sure that the Times would not abandon those cases in order to protect 
against future litigation. 
One can respect Justice Stevens and yet be disappointed in the 
quality of his opinion. 
B. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
Justice Breyer‘s dissent is joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor.  While he writes generally about history with respect to 
Heller, there is no historical analysis with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which is the issue before the Court.
75
  While Justice 
Breyer‘s opinion cites sources concerning the Second Amendment, it 
does not make any effort to determine what the framers and ratifiers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment intended and cites no sources on that topic.
76
  
Breyer claims that ―there is no reason here to believe that incorporation 
of the private self-defense right will further any other or broader 
constitutional objective.‖77  Further, Justice Breyer posits that ―the 
private self-defense right does not significantly seek to protect 
individuals who might otherwise suffer unfair or inhumane treatment at 
the hands of a majority.‖78  Members of ―a majority‖ or a minority might 
well argue with that analysis.  Surely, the right of self-defense is 
designed to ―protect individuals who might otherwise suffer unfair or 
inhumane treatment‖ by being robbed, shot, or murdered, whether the 
denial was caused by a majority or a minority. 
VI.  THE FUTURE? 
There are many unanswered questions about how Heller and 
McDonald will be applied to future cases.  Among those, Lyle 
Denniston, summarizing Justice Breyer‘s dissent in McDonald, has 
listed nineteen unanswered questions in a blog for SCOTUS.
79
 
As Professor Randy Barnett wrote, the First Amendment 
jurisprudence did not all come at once, but rather developed over time.
80
  
 
 75. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3120-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 3125. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Lyle Denniston, Analysis:  Gun Rights Go National, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2010, 5:09 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/analysis-gun-rights-go-national. 
 80. E-mail from Randy Barnett, to Richard L. Aynes, (Aug. 25, 2009) (on file with author) 
(―The complexity of First Amendment doctrine took decades to develop case by case in response to 
different problems arising in different contexts.  There is no reason to doubt that, if the courts take a 
AYNES_CONLAW_6.21.11_FINAL FOR WEBSITE 6/21/2011  6:17 PM 
2011] MCDONALD V. CHICAGO 195 
He suggested the same would be true of the Second Amendment post-
Heller cases.
81
  I am not troubled by the Court moving slowly and 
developing these tests over time.  Indeed, had the majority moved more 
quickly, they would have been criticized for dicta and even for deciding 
matters in which there was no case in controversy.  It is a worthy project 
for one to try to fill in some of the blank spaces and help the courts 
decide what they can and cannot uphold in the future. 
Yet, some of the issues to be faced stemmed from the Court‘s 
insistence on deriving a right to self-defense from the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.  The right of self-defense applies to 
people who do not use weapons and could easily be recognized under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Article 
IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause,
82
 or as a right reserved to the people 
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 
Patrick Charles has suggested that we focus upon history, using, in 
part, English practices.
83
  At the same time, how do we tell what English 
practices to use and which not to use?  For example, we know that in the 
First Amendment area, English freedom of speech was largely restricted 
to prior restraint,
84
 but our First Amendment was not;
85
 we know that 
English practice allowed writs of assistance for general warrants,
86
 but 
our Fourth Amendment does not;
87
 the early American treatises 
distinguish part of Blackstone‘s treatise as inapplicable to the U.S. 
because sovereignty was in the Crown in England and in the people in 
the U.S.
88
  This history tells us we cannot import English practice 
wholesale.  Does one need to acknowledge that and then provide some 
―test‖ on how we know what to use? 
 
right to keep and bear arms just as seriously as they do the freedom of speech they will not 
eventually develop the same sort of nuanced doctrines that take account of the difference between 
speech and weapons.‖).  See also Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 314 (1825) (drawing 
an analogy between the First and the Second Amendments and indicating that both could be 
punished for abuses, such a libel). 
 81. E-mail from Randy Barnett, to Richard L. Aynes, supra note 80. 
 82. E.g., State v. Hardy, 60 Ohio App.2d 325, 397 N.E.2d 773 (1978) (if the State were to 
order someone to die rather than act in self-defense, that would be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause). 
 83. See Charles, supra note 18. 
 84. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.3(c) 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 85. Id. 
 86. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 66 (1998). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2006) [hereinafter Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Enumerated Rights?]. 
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McDonald promises to be one of the standard cases studied by 
lawyers.
89
  Jon Roland of the Constitution Society has referred to it as a 
―landmark‖ decision.90 
What the majority and the dissent seem to have in common is the 
extent to which the Justices are ―Court-centric.‖  None of them have 
ever played a major role in the legislative process—such as Justice 
Black—nor in the executive branch—such as Justice Douglas.  They all 
seem overly concerned about what the Court has done (precedent) rather 
than what the Constitution requires. 
There is a second aspect of this argument.  The unresolved 
questions pointed out by several academics, the dissent, and Lyle 
Denniston all go to the fact that the Court is not a legislature.  Yes, if this 
were the Chicago City Council one would expect a full, detailed 
explanation of the legislation and where we go from here.  But it is not.  
It is a Court charged with deciding the case before it, not with creating 
dicta without the benefit of a concrete case before it or without the 
benefit of briefing by opposing sides. 
The New York Times whimpers:  ―[The Court] provided very little 
guidance as to what is reasonable, leaving lawmakers and judges to 
thrash it out. . .‖91  No, like everyone else, the Times will have to wait for 
a tangible case that presents real issues for the Court to consider after 
two disputing parties have done their best to brief both sides of the issue.  
This is how the Court works – not like the editorial pages of a 
newspaper. 
Just four days after the McDonald decision, the Chicago City 
Council passed, 45-0, a set of new gun regulations that can only be 
 
 89. The supplements to Constitutional Law casebooks include excerpts from McDonald, as 
well as its rival for attention for this term, Citizens United. See, e.g., CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  2010 SUPPLEMENT 30-38 (McDonald) and 74-92 (Citizens United);JEROME 
A. BARRON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS, SEVENTH 
EDITION, 2010 SUPPLEMENT 84-104 (McDonald) and 228-46 (Citizens United); WILLIAM D. 
ARAIZA, PHOEBE A. HADDON, DOROTHY E. ROBERTS & M. ISABEL MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW:  CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES, THIRD EDITION, 2010 SUPPLEMENT 35-68 (McDonald) 
and 179-91 (Citizens United); and DOUGLASS W. KMIEC, STEPHEN PRESSER, JOHN C. EASTMAN & 
RAYMOND B. MARCIN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:  HISTORY, CASES AND 
PHILOSOPHY; THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION; 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, THIRD EDITION, COMBINED 2010 
SUPPLEMENT v (referring to McDonald as ―highly controversial and jurisprudentially fascinating‖), 
vi (noting that Citizens United was the case President Obama discussed in his State of the Union 
message and to which Justice Alito mouthed the words ―Not true.‖),  1-53 (McDonald) and 137-66 
(Citizens United). 
 90. E-mail posted to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu on June 28, 2010.  
 91. The Hard Work of Gun Control, supra note 73.  
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designed to create another round of litigation.
92
  Having just lost its case, 
Chicago enacted what the Chicago Sun-Times calls the ordinance the 
―most restricted in the nation‖ and neither Mayor Dailey nor Maria 
Georges disputed the claim.
93
  To its credit, the Times recognized the 
confrontational nature of the ordinance, noting, perhaps diplomatically, 
that it ―edged right up to the line drawn by the court.‖94  But the Times 
never acknowledge that it was Chicago‘s extreme ordinance in the first 
place that prompted the initial litigation and that it is Chicago‘s ―in your 
face‖ extremism that prompts a new round of litigation. 
The Times believes the fault here lies with ―the gun lobby‖ and not 
with the people who provide the opportunity to win cases by extreme 
ordinances.
95
  Yet, though it may be sent in code, the editorial of the 
Times actually ends in good advice and a somewhat hidden rebuke to the 
Chicago City Council:  ―Lawmakers need not match the [gun] lobby‘s 
obduracy.  Cities and states should counter with tough but sensible laws 
designed to resist legal challenges . . . .‖96 
Ordinances that go to what legislators think is ―the edge‖ are 
unlikely to do this.
97
  Statements attributed to Mayor Dailey, if true, 
make it clear that he thinks of this as a policy issue rather than 
constitutional issue:  ―[The Justices] don‘t seem to appreciate the full 
scope of gun violence in America.‖98  One could just as easily say that 
Mayor Daley does not appreciate the constraints of the Constitution. 
There is no question that cities like Chicago and D.C. have very 
serious challenges with crime.
99
  One way of looking at this is that 
 
 92. The very minimal time, itself, shows that no serious attention was given to the issue by the 
Council. The Court‘s opinion itself is over 120 pages. It takes a full ½ day to read the full opinion 
with any degree of seriousness.  To contemplate a proper response would take more than four days. 
The rush to pass the ordinance and the vituperative language used by the City Council shows a lack 
of seriousness. The City Council was obviously quite willing to spend taxpayer money in litigation.  
It would have been money better spent on convening a group of experts to help them establish 
ordinances that comply with the Court‘s decisions or putting more police officers on the streets. 
 93. Abdon M. Pallasch, Chicago Approves New Gun Restrictions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4, 
2010. 
 94. Since the Times editorial writings ―strongly disagreed‖ with McDonald, it is not clear that 
they could accurately assess what was the ―edge‖ of the Court‘s holding.  Reading McDonald with 
the proverbial ―jaundiced eye‖, they are likely to read the holding as more restrictive than it actually 
is. The Hard Work of Gun Control, supra note 73. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Steve Chapman, Defenseless in Chicago, or the Flaws in Gun Control, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE,  reprinted in AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 2, 2010, at A-7. (describing mainly the 
different views on the effectiveness of handgun registration). 
 99. The Amicus Brief of the Rutherford Institute in McDonald indicates that in 2008, Chicago 
experienced 412 homicides and 92% of them occurred in a home. Brief for Rutherford Institute as 
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Chicago wants to solve its problems in the cheapest way possible:  by 
violating the Constitution rather than by providing more police 
protection, increasing high school and college graduation rates, 
providing good jobs for its people, and other related matters. 
This past gun ban obviously did not work in preventing homicides.  
Whether it contained a problem that could have been worse or not is a 
matter over which criminologists argue.  But it is like saying we would 
have more safety if there was no protection against searches and seizures 
and police could wiretap at will, or if the burden of proof was on the 
defendant to prove his/her innocence. 
VII.  THE MARKS RULE 
Patrick Charles and others have been concerned about the Marks 
question and whether the plurality of four Justice opinions was the 
―narrowest‖ which would control or whether Justice Thomas‘s 
concurring opinion would control.
100
  Some have concluded that the 
Alito plurality rejected Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion.101 
However, as Randy Barnett emphasized, the plurality never denied 
that Justice Thomas‘s concurring opinion was correct.102  Rather, the 
plurality simply indicated that it was not necessary to decide the case to 
reach the question of the approach taken by Justice Thomas.
103
  For 
example, Justice Scalia, in talking about his own misgivings over the 
concept of substantive due process and the Court‘s precedent, indicates:  
―This case does not require me to consider that view, since 
straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.‖104 
 Standards of Review 
One of the unanswered questions that apparently cause people the 
most anguish is:  what will the standard of review be?
105
 
 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4030385. 
 100. See Charles, supra note 18. 
 101. Cohen & Stearns, supra note 13 at 35. 
 102. Barnett, The Differences Between McDonald and the Challenge to Economic Mandates, 
supra note 5. 
 103. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3085-86 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 105. See Lawrence B. Solum, Charles on McDonald v. City of Chicago & the Standard of 
Review, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/08/Charles-on-mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago-the-
standard-of-review.html.  See also Eugene Volokh, What Burden of Proof Is Constitutionally 
Required for Denying Gun Rights to the Allegedly Dangerous and Mentally Infirm?, THE VOLOKH 
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Patrick Charles, who has authored many works on the Second 
Amendment, opposed the decision in Heller and then opposed its 
extension in McDonald, arguing, in part, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers only intended to protect a right to serve in the militia.
106
  Charles 
has an impressive knowledge of the pre-Constitutional English practices 
and early Americans ones.  Wittingly or unwittingly, he takes a position 
essentially taken by those who argue that the Due Process and Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses were designed to protect only equality against 
discrimination. 
As Randy Barnett has noted, at one time the draft Fourteenth 
Amendment, while pending in the Joint Committee of Reconstruction, 
contained both a non-discrimination provision and the current 
Fourteenth Amendment, strongly suggesting that the two were 
different.
107
  Further, the Equal Protection Clause does that job quite 
nicely and if that were the only goal of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, it would be superfluous. 
Rather, it has long been established that the protection was not 
designed for the militia.
108
   During the debates over the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, Sidney Clarke (R-Kansas) asked:  Who were to be protected by 
the Act?  His answer was: 
Not the present militia; but the brave black soldiers of the Union, 
disarmed and robbed by this wicked despotic order.  Nearly every 
white man in [Mississippi] that could bear arms was in the rebel ranks.  
Nearly all of their able-bodied [Black] men who could reach our lines 
enlisted under the old flag.  Many of these brave defenders of the 
nation paid for their arms with which they went to battle . . . .  [T]he 
―reconstructed‖ state authorities of Mississippi were allowed to rob 
and disarm our veteran soldiers and arm the rebels fresh from the field 
of treasonable strife.  Sir, the disarmed loyalist of Alabama, 
 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:33 PM) http://volokh.com/2010/10/08/what-burden-of-proof-is-
constitutionally-required-for-denying-gun-rights-to-the-allegedly-mentally-infirm/ (last visited Oct. 
12, 2010). 
 106. Solum, supra note 112.  See also Charles, supra note 18. 
 107. Randy Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?  The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, (J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS, vol. 3, no. 1(forthcoming) (Georgetown Public Law, Research 
Paper No. 10-06), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538862 [hereinafter Barnett, Whence 
Comes Section One?].  Charles‘ focus is upon whether the right applies to all persons or only 
citizens.  On that issue, he may be correct:  Marks may require that McDonald be read to only apply 
to citizens.  Yet this does not preclude a majority of a future Court from accepting the view of the 
McDonald plurality over the vote of Justice Thomas as a single Justice on other issues.   
 108. Robert J. Cottrol, Structure, Participation, Citizenship, and Right:  Lessons from Akhil 
Amar’s Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 87 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2322 (1999) (book review).    
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Mississippi, and Louisiana are powerless to-day, and oppressed by the 
pardoned and encouraged rebels of those States.
109
 
Other unresolved issues involve the use of non-lethal weapons.
110
  I 
would suggest that another issue is whether self-defense without a gun is 
protected under the Constitution.  By deriving the right to self-defense 
from the Second Amendment, the Court majority seems to have 
carefully linked to the use of a weapon that fires bullets.
111
  But may an 
unarmed person not fight back when attacked by someone?  May a 
carpenter who is threatened by a person with a knife not pick up his 
hammer to act in self-defense? 
It has long been illegal for convicted felons to possess and use 
weapons.
112
  This seems to support the Heller and McDonald majority 
dicta that convicted felons may, if the state chooses, not possess arms.
113
  
Don Kates, a long-time advocate of the Second Amendment protection 
of the rights of gun owners, writes:  ―Everyone except perhaps the most 
extreme libertarians generally agrees with prohibiting possession of 
firearms by convicted felons, violent misdemeanants and the mentally 
unbalanced—as our laws currently do.‖114 
However, what happens when an unarmed convicted felon is 
attacked by someone with arms?  May the felon not take the weapon 
away for the attacker and use it on a second attacker who is armed?  If 
the convicted felon knows the location of a weapon controlled by a third 
party, is a convicted felon to die rather than retrieving third-party‘s 
weapon and using it in self defense?
115
  But then how does one 
determine who owned the weapon and what is a pretext for the convicted 
felon owning a weapon?
116
 
 
 109. Id. at 2323 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).   
 110. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
1387 (2009); Paul H. Robinson, Op-Ed., Shoot to Stun, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/opinion/02robinson.html, and Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-
Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend 
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 (2009). 
 111. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 112. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 113. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570). 
 114. Don B. Kates, The Right to Arms:  The Criminology of Guns 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE 
NOVO 86 (2010).  Kates also states that all societies have limited arms to ―trustworthy‖ people, 
which does not include serious felons. In the eighteenth century, Kates indicates, the felons were 
―civilly dead‖ and were not considered part of ―the people.‖ Id. at 97. 
 115. See State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. Ct. 1978). 
 116. See State v. Smead, 9th Dist. C. A. No. 24903, 2010-Ohio-4462 (D. Ohio), available at 
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/9/2010/2010-ohio-4462.pdf.  
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What about the claim that a convicted felon or one unlicensed to 
have a gun, found a loaded gun in his yard, at a playground, or other 
dangerous place when he came home and for safety reasons, picked it 
up, intending to turn it into the police the next day?
117
 
There are some older cases that suggest that the Second 
Amendment protects the right to have arms by ―the whole people, old 
and young, men, women, and boys . . . .‖118  On the other hand, the First 
Circuit recently upheld a federal statute that makes it a crime for a minor 
to have a handgun.
119
 
While there are many unanswered questions, there are also 
solutions.  Professor Adam Winkler noted in December of 2009, that 
there had been 150 post-Heller challenges in federal courts to federal 
gun controversy over the course of a year.
120
  ―Not one law has been 
invalidated for violation of the Second Amendment since Heller.‖121  
Similarly, Eugene Volokh notes that forty-four of the fifty states have 
state constitutional provisions that ―expressly secure a right to keep and 
bear arms‖ and ―at least 40 of them clearly protect and individual right, 
aimed partly at self-defense.‖122  ―Yet state courts interpreting those 
provisions have upheld the great majority of all modest gun controls that 
they have considered.‖123 
Even Dennis Henigan of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
believes that ―the national experience with the Brady Act, which 
mandates a background check on persons buying guns from licensed 
dealers, also suggests that even fairly modest gun restrictions can reduce 
the use of guns in crime.‖124  He quotes, with apparent approval, 
considerations of such steps as ―blocking gun sales to persons on the 
terrorist watch list, requiring gun owners to report lost and stolen guns, 
 
 117. See Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323 (D.C. 2009). 
 118. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (emphasis added). 
 119. United States v. Rene, 583 F.3d 8, (1st Cir. 2009).  See also State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash.2d 
276, 225 P.3d 995 ( 2010) (the statute does have multiple exceptions for underage use). 
 120. Heller Requires Scrutiny of Federal Ban on Guns Possession by Domestic Abusers, 78 
U.S.L.W. 1313 (Dec. 1, 2009). But see, United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 
1999) (rev’d and remanded) (holding that a federal statute which makes it a crime to  possess a 
firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order violates the second amendment).  On 
the other hand, see United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (involving the ban on 
felons possessing guns). 
 121. Adam Winkler, Heller‘s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551,1566 (2009). 
 122. Eugene Volokh, States’ Rights vs. Gun Rights (Mar. 2, 2010, 7:17 PM) 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/states-rights-vs-=gun-rights.?hp (last visited 
July 3, 2010). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Henigan, supra note 9, at 334 (citing statistics to support the claim). 
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and providing more crime data to local police.‖125  Further, he 
acknowledges that ―there are many strategies for fighting crime and 
violence not involving gun control that should be explored and 
implemented . . .‖126  Henigan quotes, with apparent approval, Professor 
Tushnet‘s pre-Heller suggestions that what is needed is ―more police on 
the streets, ensuring that young people have better access to education 
and job, more disparagement by leading public figures of violence on 
television and in movies, or whatever else serious inquiry into the cause 
of crime and violence reveals to be somewhat effective policies.‖127  
Kates, based on travels in Europe, suggests that police might be 
dispatched in teams and not sent out for tasks as single, unsupported 
officers and that banks follow a European design that makes them more 
difficult to rob.
128
 
One of the concerns about the deregulation of guns is their potential 
use for the unauthorized use by minors and accidents in the home.  But 
there are solutions.  For example, at this year‘s Heritage Festival in 
Kent, Ohio, the Police Department handed out 200 free firearms safety 
kits, which each included a gun lock.
129
  Similarly, as I have previously 
noted, there is now on the market a ―biometric safe‖ in which one could 
store a handgun and yet have ready access because it opens upon 
verification of a fingerprint. 
There is, of course, the large question of whether Heller and 
McDonald are limited to the right to have guns in the home
130
 or which 
of those cases or their later progeny will extend the right to areas outside 
of the home remains to be seen. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Though the changes worked by McDonald are slight when viewed 
from a national prospective, they hold open a variety of issues upon 
which large steps can be taken.  As set forth above, there are a variety of 
issues which will have to be addressed and their resolution may affect 
the future of the people of each state and of the nation. 
 
 125. Id. at 336.  It is unclear what additional data he thinks should be reported to police.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 335. 
 128. Kates, supra note 114, at 96. 
 129. Gun Locks, AKRON BEACON J., June, 28 2010. 
 130. Professor Darrell A. H. Miller, for example, has argued that the regulatory regime for 
guns should be analogous to that of pornography, allowing use in the home but not outside of it. 
Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut:  Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1278 (2009). 
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People who view themselves as conservatives may well have to 
resolve the conflict between less gun regulations and the payment of 
more taxes for the containment or reduction of crime. 
We would expect there would be normal interpretive matters with 
the meaning of the decision and that reasonable people may disagree.  
But there are also individuals of both points of view who may go beyond 
the pale of reason.  On the one hand, one thinks of the protester who 
brought an AK-47 to a rally in Arizona
131
 or the litigant who wanted to 
be able to take a handgun into the public area of the Atlanta Airport.
132
 
On the other hand, one sees actions by people like the Council 
people of Chicago, who, having lost in the McDonald, defiantly pass 
regulations that they know or should know cannot be sustained in 
court.
133
  Of more concern is that the strategy adopted by opponents of 
Roe v. Wade
134
 will be adopted and opponents will try to use regulations, 
taxes, and other methods of making reasonable gun ownership as 
difficult as possible. 
Where this will all end, no one can tell.  But it will depend upon the 
common sense of the American people to insure that only reasonable 
legislation (even if debatable) is passed and the common sense of the 
courts to insure that a reasonably robust right to bear arms survives the 
attacks made upon by their opponents and can exist in fact, as well as 
theory. 
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